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NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
____________
No. 11-2334
____________
WILLIAM HUDSON, INDIVIDUALLY AND
ON BEHALF OF ALL OTHERS SIMILARLY SITUATED,
Appellant
v.
EAGLEMARK SAVINGS BANK;
HARLEY-DAVIDSON CREDIT CORP.
____________
On Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania
(D.C. No. 2-10-cv-06994)
District Judge: Honorable John R. Padova
____________
Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a)
March 20, 2012
Before: RENDELL, FISHER and CHAGARES, Circuit Judges.
(Filed: March 30, 2012)
____________
OPINION OF THE COURT
____________
FISHER, Circuit Judge.
William Hudson (“Hudson”), individually and on behalf of all others similarly
situated, appeals the District Court’s grant of the motion to dismiss for failure to state a

claim filed by Eaglemark Savings Bank (“Eaglemark”) and Harley-Davidson Credit
Corp. (“HDCC”) (collectively, “Defendants”). For the reasons stated below, we will
affirm the District Court.
I.
We write principally for the parties, who are familiar with the factual context and
legal history of this case. Therefore, we will set forth only those facts necessary to our
analysis.
On June 30, 2007, Hudson purchased a motorcycle from Smaltz’s HarleyDavidson (“Smatlz’s”), a Harley-Davidson franchise dealer located in Montgomery
County, Pennsylvania. Smaltz’s arranged for on-site financing of the motorcycle through
Eaglemark, a subsidiary of HDCC. Hudson signed a Bill of Sale, listing Smaltz’s as the
seller, and signed a Promissory Note and Security Agreement (“Promissory Note”),
listing Eaglemark as the lender. The Promissory Note stated that, in the event of a
repossession, “lender will mail a written notice of sale to you no less than ten (10) and no
more than twenty (20) days (depending on the state you reside in) before selling the
vehicle.” The Promissory Note also stated that, upon Eaglemark’s receipt and funding of
the contract, the contract would automatically be assigned to HDCC.
In 2009, Hudson fell behind on his monthly payments to HDCC. On October 6,
2009, HDCC repossessed his motorcycle and sent to Hudson a Notice of Our Plan to Sell
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Property (“Notice”), which indicated that HDCC planned to sell the motorcycle “at a
private sale sometime after October 16, 2009.”
Hudson filed his putative consumer class action in the Court of Common Pleas of
Montgomery County, Pennsylvania. On December 1, 2010, Defendants removed the
case to the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania, asserting
jurisdiction under the Class Action Fairness Act of 2005. 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d). After the
Defendants moved to dismiss the case for failure to state a claim, Hudson filed an
Amended Complaint. Defendants then filed a Motion to Dismiss the Amended
Complaint. On May 9, 2011, the District Court granted the Defendants’ motion. Hudson
filed a timely Notice of Appeal on May 17, 2011.
II.
The District Court had subject matter jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1332. We
have appellate jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We exercise plenary review over a
district court’s order granting a motion to dismiss. Marcavage v. Nat’l Park Serv., 666
F.3d 856, 858 (3d Cir. 2012) (citation omitted). “When reviewing a Rule 12(b)(6)
dismissal, we accept as true all well-pled factual allegations in the complaint, and view
them in the light most favorable to the plaintiff.” Id. (citation omitted).
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III.
Because we have diversity jurisdiction over this case, we must apply
Pennsylvania’s law to the facts of this case. Berrier v. Simplicity Mfg., Inc., 563 F.3d 38,
46 n.11 (3d Cir. 2009) (citation omitted).
Hudson first submits that the District Court erred in finding that Pennsylvania’s
Motor Vehicle Sales Finance Act (“MVSFA”), 69 Pa. Cons. Stat. §§ 601-637.1, does not
apply to Hudson’s contract with Eaglemark and HDCC. At the District Court, Hudson
argued that the MVSFA requires a lender to provide a fifteen-day notice of its intent to
sell a repossessed motor vehicle, 69 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 623(D), so the Defendants violated
the statute by only providing him with a notice ten days prior to the sale. We agree with
the District Court that the MVSFA does not apply to Hudson’s contract with the
Defendants.
Under Pennsylvania law, courts first look to the language of the statute, and
“[w]hen the words of a statute are clear and free from all ambiguity,” courts cannot
disregard the text of the statute. 1 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 1921(b). “When the words of the
statute are not explicit,” then courts may consider other evidence to ascertain “the
intention of the General Assembly.” Id. § 1921(c).
The MVSFA provides that “[w]hen repossession of a motor vehicle, which is the
subject of an installment contract, is effected otherwise than by legal process, the holder
. . . shall give notice to the buyer of the holder’s intent to re-sell the motor vehicle at the
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expiration of fifteen (15) days from the date of mailing such notice.” 69 Pa. Cons. Stat.
§ 623(D) (emphasis added). An “installment contract” under the MVSFA is “any
contract for the retail sale of a motor vehicle, or which has a similar purpose or effect
under which part or all of the price is payable in two or more scheduled payments
subsequent to the making of such contract.” 69 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 603(10). The
Promissory Note, which listed Eaglemark as the lender, was not an installment contract
because it was not a “contract for the retail sale of a motor vehicle.” Id. Rather, it was a
contract for the financing of Hudson’s motorcycle purchase. Moreover, the Promissory
Note did not have the “purpose” or “effect” of selling the motorcycle to Hudson, who
purchased the motorcycle from Smaltz’s by signing a separate Bill of Sale. The Bill of
Sale unambiguously stated that the “Dealer [Smaltz’s] and Purchaser [Hudson] are the
sole parties to this Order,” so Eaglemark and HDCC were not parties to the contract
pertaining to the sale of the motorcycle.
Hudson nevertheless argues that the MVSFA would apply to his contract with the
Defendants under the “dragging the body” theory of contract interpretation. The name is
derived from the concept that the motor vehicle dealer drags the customer’s body to a
specific lender that is pre-selected by the dealer. Under the “dragging the body” theory,
Hudson’s Promissory Note with Eaglemark/HDCC and his Bill of Sale with Smaltz’s
would be collapsed into a single transaction, making the MVSFA apply to Hudson’s
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contract with Eaglemark/HDCC. We reject Hudson’s argument and hold that the District
Court did not err in declining to recognize this “dragging the body” theory.
Because the Pennsylvania Supreme Court has never addressed the question of
whether the MVSFA applies to “dragging the body” loans, “we must predict how the
[Pennsylvania] Supreme Court would rule if presented with this case.” Holmes v. Kimco
Realty Corp., 598 F.3d 115, 118 (3d Cir. 2010) (internal quotation marks and citation
omitted). In doing so, we “must give serious consideration to the decisions of the
intermediate appellate courts[.]” Robinson v. Jiffy Executive Limousine Co., 4 F.3d 237,
242 (3d Cir. 1993) (citations omitted). As the District Court stated, in the only state
appellate court decision addressing this issue, an evenly-divided Superior Court affirmed
a lower court decision declining to apply the MVSFA to a “dragging the body”
transaction. Anderson v. Auto. Fund, 391 A.2d 642, 644 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1978) (per
curiam). Because the court was evenly divided on whether the MVSFA applied to
“dragging the body” loans, the case did not establish precedent for either side of the
issue. Phila. v. Dist. Council 33, AFL-CIO, 469 A.2d 1051, 1057, n.4 (Pa. 1983) (Nix, J.
dissenting). And in examining the statutory language, we cannot fit the current
transaction neatly into the definition that the Pennsylvania legislature chose for
“installment contract.” Thus, we cannot make the leap suggested by Hudson that would
allow us to collapse the transaction so that it would be governed by the MVSFA. We do
“not feel that [this Court’s] proper role is to lead the state courts in the interpretation of
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state law.” Manning v. Princeton Consumer Discount Co., 380 F. Supp. 116, 120 (E.D.
Pa. 1974). Therefore, we decline to forge a novel path in Pennsylvania law by holding
that the State Supreme Court would apply the MVSFA to Hudson’s “dragging the body”
loan.
Finally, Hudson submits the District Court erroneously held that his Amended
Complaint failed to satisfy the pleading standard under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8.
We disagree. Contrary to Hudson’s contention, the District Court properly held that
Hudson failed to state a claim that the ten-day notice was unreasonable.
A creditor must send “a reasonable authenticated notification of disposition” to all
parties entitled to receive notice. 13 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 9611(b). A notification is
unreasonable when it “is sent so near to the disposition date that a notified person could
not be expected to act on or take account of the notification[.]” 13 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 9612
cmt. 2. Hudson’s conclusory assertion that the notice was unreasonable, without facts
showing how he could not be expected to act in response to the notice or take account of
the notice, was insufficient to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. See
Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1949 (2009) (Rule 8 “does not require detailed factual
allegations, but it demands more than an unadorned, the-defendant-unlawfully-harmedme accusation. A pleading that offers labels and conclusions or a formulaic recitation of
the elements of a cause of action will not do.” (internal quotation marks and citations
omitted)).
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IV.
For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm the District Court’s order.
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